Endogenous R&D and Intellectual Property Laws in Developed and Emerging Economies

The incentive of providing protection of intellectual property has been analyzed, both for an emerging economy as well as for a developed economy. The optimal patent length and the optimal patent breadth within a country are found to be positively related to each other for a fixed structure of laws abroad. Moreover, a country can respond to stronger patent protection abroad by weakening its patent protection under certain circumstances and by strengthening its patent protection under other circumstances. These results depend upon the curvature of the R&D production function. Finally, we investigate the impact of an increase in the willingness-to-pay in the emerging economy and find conditions under which there is an improvement in both patent length as well as patent breadth in the emerging economy.Patent Length, Patent Breadth, Productivity

Licensing and Patent Protection

We show the impact of technology licensing on optimal patent policy. Strong patent protection that eliminates imitation may not be the equilibrium outcome in the presence of licensing. Depending on the cost of innovation, licensing may either increase or reduce the strength of the patent protection.Patent protection; Technology licensing; Welfare

Technology licensing in a differentiated oligopoly

We show the effects of product differentiation and competition on technology licensing by an outside innovator. Both the innovator and the society are better off under royalty licensing compared to auction (or fixed-fee) if the number of potential licensees is sufficiently large, irrespective of Cournot and Bertrand competition. We find that the relationship between product differentiation and the minimum number of potential licensees that is required to make royalty licensing profitable to the innovator is non-monotonic under Cournot competition, while it is positive under Bertrand competition. Hence, there are degrees of product differentiation for which neither the innovator nor the antitrust authority requires information about the type of product market competition while deciding on the licensing contract. It follows from our analysis that the innovator prefers auction plus royalty licensing (or fixed-fee plus royalty) over either royalty licensing or auction.Auction; Licensing; Royalty; Product Differentiation

Information Disclosure through Technology Licensing

We show that if information transmission through an honest outside agency is not possible due to the possibility of collusion between the firms and the outside agency, information transmission is possible through technology licensing. However, unlike the case of a cost-free honest outside agency, where information transmission always occurs under a quantity setting oligopoly, information transmission through licensing does not occur always

Technology Licensing in a Differentiated Oligopoly

We show the effects of product differentiation and product market competition on technology licensing by an outside innovator. For a certain range of product differentiation, both the innovator and the society prefer royalty licensing compared to auction (or fixed-fee), irrespective of Cournot and Bertrand competitions, if the number of potential licensees is sufficiently large. Hence, for such a range of product differentiation, neither the innovator nor the antitrust authority requires information about the type of product market competition in choosing the type of the licensing contract

Workplace Deviance and Recession

We examine the relationship between the incidence of workplace deviance (on-the-job crime) and the state of the economy. A worker\u27s probability of future employment depends on whether she has been deviant as well as on the availability of jobs. Using a two period model we show that the net impact on deviant behavior to changes in unemployment can go either way depending upon the nature of the equilibrium. Two kinds of equilibria are possible. In one, a non-deviant\u27s probability of being employed increases as expected market conditions improve which lowers the incentive to be a deviant. In contrast, in the other kind of equilibrium, the deviant\u27s probability of being employed increases when market conditions improve which increases the incentive to be a deviant. In either case, there is a setup cost to deviant behavior and the attractiveness of incurring that increases with an increase in expected probability of future employment which unambiguously increases the incentive to be deviant. In the first kind of equilibrium, the two effects counteract each other, while in the second they reinforce each other. Finally, we show that an increase in optimism, i.e. a reduction in the probability of facing a recession unambiguously increases deviant behavior

Licensing and Patent Protection

We show the impact of technology licensing on optimal patent policy. Strong patent protection that eliminates imitation may not be the equilibrium outcome in the presence of licensing. Depending on the cost of innovation, licensing may either increase or reduce the strength of the patent protection

A Clashing Viewpoint Concerning India: A Critique of Goldman Sachs 2007 Report

The centerpiece of the 2007 Report by Goldman Sachs is the prediction of India\u27s phenomenal economic growth and power in the next few decades. In this article we critique the conceptual validity of that prognosis. In particular, we highlight several hard and soft infrastructure impediments to India\u27s emergence as a major economic power

An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Certificate of Need Law on Utilization of Inpatient Services

We investigate the impact of Certificate of Need (CON) Law and its stringency on Inpatient service utilization measured by hospital occupancy. We show that on average the CON legislation reduces utilization in Inpatient units. Besides, we do not find sufficient statistical evidence to reject the exogenous assumption of CON and its features. Furthermore, we confirm the qualitative nature of these key findings by an analysis featuring Inpatient length of stay (LOS). Other findings include the following: Inpatient utilization is positively related to proportion of females in a state and the proportion of Asian-Americans; a statistically significant positive relationship exists between GDP and utilization and a negative one is noted between utilization and proportion of population on Medicare; a statistically significant positive relationship is noted between population availing ED services in a state and Inpatient utilization; as the number of democratic senators in a state increases, it has a negative impact on utilization of Inpatient services

Endogenous R&D and Intellectual Property Laws in Developed and Emerging Economies

The incentive of providing protection of intellectual property has been analyzed, both for an emerging economy as well as for a developed economy. The optimal patent length and the optimal patent breadth within a country are found to be positively related to each other for a fixed structure of laws abroad. Moreover, a country can respond to stronger patent protection abroad by weakening its patent protection under certain circumstances and by strengthening its patent protection under other circumstances. These results depend upon the curvature of the R&D production function. Finally, we investigate the impact of an increase in the willingness-to-pay in the emerging economy and find conditions under which there is an improvement in both patent length as well as patent breadth in the emerging economy